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   Suppose  you  find  yourself  in  the  following  ³tradeoff´  situation.  
Tradeoff:  you  own  a  life  saving  drug  which  you  can  give  away  at  
only  small  cost  to  yourself.  ³Six  people  will  all  certainly  die  if  they  
are  not  treated  with  the  drug.    But  one  of  the  six  requires  all  of  the  
drug  if  he  is  to  survive.  Each  of  the  other  five  requires  only  one-­
fifth  of  the  drug.´1  
All  six  persons  are  strangers  to  you.  
   What  should  you  do?  The  costs  to  you  of  giving  away  the  drug  are  low,  so  you  
should  certainly  do  so.  But  to  whom  should  you  give  it?    Nearly  all  of  us  judge  that  you  
ought  to  save  the  five  people  who  require  only  one  fifth  of  the  drug.    The  ³numbers  
problem´  is  the  problem  of  saying  why  it  is  that  you  ought  to  save  the  five.           
   Consequentialists,  and  those  sympathetic  to  consequentialism,  are  thought  to  
have  an  easy  time  answering  this  question.    They  endorse  the  principle  that  one  ought  to  
act  in  the  way  that  brings  about  the  best  possible  state  of  affairs.    Applying  this  
principle,  they  say  that  you  should  save  the  five  because  doing  so  will  bring  about  a  
better  state  of  affairs  than  saving  one.    But  many  philosophers  reject  the  
consequentialist  principle.    They  claim,  for  instance,  that  it  makes  implausible  
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is  unintelligible.      
   For  these  non-­consequentialist  philosophers,  the  numbers  problem  is  thought  to  
be  very  hard.    In  this  paper  I  am  going  to  ask  whether  this  is  true.    I  am  going  to  look  at  
what  answers  you  can  give  to  the  numbers  problem  if  you  are  a  non-­consequentialist.    
That  is,  I  am  going  to  consider  what  answers  you  can  give  without  appealing  to  the  
goodness  of  states  of  affairs.      
   The  standard  non-­consequentialist  accounts  try  to  answer  the  problem  by  
appealing  to  fairness.    According  to  these  accounts,  you  ought  to  save  the  five  because  
this  is  the  only  way  to  treat  each  needy  person  fairly.    If  you  fail  to  save  the  five,  they  say,  
then  there  is  at  least  one  member  of  the  five  that  you  will  have  treated  unfairly.      
   I  think  this  approach  is  radically  mistaken.    Appealing  to  fairness  will  not  allow  
us  to  explain  why  you  should  save  more  and,  furthermore,  considerations  of  fairness  are  
irrelevant  in  cases  such  as  Tradeoff.    What  morality  centrally  requires  of  us  in  Tradeoff  
is  that  we  be  beneficent,  or  act  in  ways  that  show  regard  for  the  needs  of  others.    I  think  
the  beneficent  thing  to  do  is  to  save  the  five,  and  will  show  why.      
   I  will  proceed  as  follows.    I  first  show  some  prima  facie  problems  with  appealing  
to  fairness  to  justify  saving  five  (section  2)  and  then  argue  that  recent  accounts  have  not  
surmounted  these  problems  (section  3).    In  section  4,  I  argue  that,  furthermore,  fairness  
is  irrelevant  in  a  case  such  as  Tradeoff.    In  section  5  I  offer  my  own  account  of  why  you  
should  save  the  greater  number  in  Tradeoff.    Failing  to  save  the  greater  number,  I  claim,  
would  be  unbeneficent.    In  section  6,  I  consider  choices  between  lives  of  a  different  kind,  
where  fairness  plausibly  does  have  some  role  to  play  in  explaining  why  we  should  save  
the  many  and  argue  that  there  are  distinctive  reason  why,  in  these  cases,  fairness  may  




   The  standard  non-­consequentialist  approaches  to  the  numbers  problem  begin  
with  the  idea  that  one  must  respond  fairly  to  those  who  need  your  aid.2    So,  I  am  going  
to  begin  by  considering  the  idea  of  fairness  in  our  dealings  with  others.      
   We  appeal  to  fairness  frequently  in  our  everyday  life.    For  instance,  suppose  that  
a  parent  provides  more  help  to  one  of  her  children  than  another.    This  seems  to  be  
unfair  treatment  of  the  less  favoured  child.    Suppose  that  a  firm  pays  its  female  workers  
less  than  male  workers  who  do  the  same  jobs.    This  would  be  considered  unfair  
treatment  of  the  female  employees.    Or,  suppose  that  grants  for  scientific  research  never  
go  to  members  of  a  particular  race.    We  would  think  candidates  of  that  race  are  being  
treated  unfairly.          
   Fairness  in  this  sense  is  a  requirement  on  how  we  treat  others.    It  is  comparative:  
it  concerns  how  we  treat  some  people  compared  with  how  we  treat  others.    It  requires,  
roughly,  that  we  treat  all  relevantly  similar  persons  similarly.3    Thus,  the  children  who  
are  each  equally  in  need  of  the  parent's  help  should  be  given  the  same  assistance,  
employees  doing  similar  jobs  should  be  similarly  compensated  and  so  on.    Where  we  are  
providing  benefits,  fairness  demands,  more  specifically,  that  we  benefit  people  in  
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proportion  to  their  eligibility  for  the  benefit.    Thus,  variations  in  the  size  of  grants  
should  be  in  proportion  to  how  qualified  their  recipients  are.    
   Some  ethical  theories  deny  that  fairness  has  any  fundamental  importance.    
Utilitarians,  for  instance,  deny  that  one  is  ever  bound  by  a  requirement  of  fairness.4    
They  do  think  that  we  should  sometimes  act  as  fairness  would  demand,  say  by    helping  
our  children  equally,  but  only  when,  and  because,  so  acting  would  increase  aggregate  
utility,  not  because  it  would  be  fair.  
   According  to  the  standard  non-­consequentialist  accounts  of  the  numbers  
problem,  we  are  required  to  be  fair  in  giving  aid  to  needy  strangers.    They  appeal  to  this  
general  requirement  that  we  be  fair  to  the  needy  in  order  to  explain  why  you  should  save  
the  many  in  a  case  such  as  Tradeoff.    But  before  looking  at  why  exactly  they  think  
fairness  requires  you  to  save  the  many,  I  am  going  to  briefly  discuss  some  prima  facie  
difficulties  with  showing  that  it  is  fair  to  save  the  five.      It  will  be  useful  to  consider  these  
initial  difficulities,  since  they  will  help  us  to  understand  the  arguments  for  thinking  that  
saving  five  is  fair  and  will  also  help  to  illuminate  some  of  the  problems  with  that  view.      
   So,  what  must  we  do  in  order  to  be  fair  in  giving  aid  to  strangers?    I  said  that  
fairness  requires  treating  all  relevantly  similar  individuals  similarly.    Plausibly,  when  we  
are  giving  out  aid  to  needy  strangers,  the  only  relevant  characteristic  of  any  individual  is  
the  extent  of  her  need.    That  is,  the  only  thing  that  makes  one  needy  person  more  
eligible  for  our  help  than  another  is  the  extent  of  her  need.    Thus,  fairness  requires  that  
we  help  each  needy  person  in  proportion  to  her  need.    Where  needs  are  equal,  fairness  
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requires  us  to  help  each  needy  person  equally.        
   In  Tradeoff,  those  you  can  aid  are  equally  needy.    But  it  is  impossible  for  you  to  
help  each  of  them  to  the  same  degree.    The  only  help  you  can  provide  for  any  candidate  
LVVDYLQJKHUOLIHEXWLWLVLPSRVVLEOHIRU\RXWRVDYHHDFKSHUVRQ¶VOLIH  
   It  is  thus  very  tempting  to  conclude  that  in  such  a  case  there  is  no  way  to  act  
fairly,  since  we  cannot  give  the  same  help  to  every  candidate.    If  that  is  true,  then  we  
should  simply  abandon  the  appeal  to  fairness  to  justify  saving  the  greater  number.    We  
would  then  have  to  justify  saving  the  greater  number  on  some  other  grounds.    This  the  
first  problem  I  will  mention  for  any  account  that  appeals  to  fairness:  Tradeoff  seems  
plausibly  to  be  a  case  where  fairness  simply  cannot  be  achieved.      
   The  second  problem  is  that  to  the  extent  that  fairness  can  be  achieved,  it  seems  to  
require  not  saving  the  greater  number,  but,  instead,  giving  each  candidate  an  equal  
chance  of  being  saved.    The  fairest  thing  we  can  do,  plausibly,  is  what  Taurek  proposed,  
namely  tossing  a  coin  to  pick  between  saving  the  one  or  the  five.5    Here  is  why:  
     I  said  that,  in  general,  fairness  seems  to  require  giving  equally  needy  persons  
equal  help,  and  that  doing  that  is  impossible  here.    Even  so,  we  can  still  try  to  fulfill  the  
basic  requirement  of  fairness,  which  is  to  treat  relevantly  similarly  people  similarly.    
Rather  than  giving  each  candidate  the  same  amount  of  help,  we  can,  as  a  proxy,  give  
each  candidate  an  equal  chance  of  being  helped.    We  can  thus  treat  each  candidate  
similarly  by  giving  each  the  same  chance  of  getting  our  aid.    We  can  do  this  by  using  a  
coin  toss  to  make  our  decision  about  whether  to  save  one  or  five,  thereby  giving  each  
person  a  fifty  percent  chance  of  being  saved.    If  this  line  of  reasoning  is  correct,  then  the  
                                                 
5 7DXUHN¶VSURSRVDOLVLQ7DXUHN7KHGHIHQVHRI7DXUHNWKDW,RIIHUGUDZVKHDYLO\RQ%URRPH
(1990-91).   
fairest  thing  to  do  in  the  circumstances  is  not  to  save  the  greater  number,  but,  instead,  
to  toss  a  coin  to  decide  whether  to  save  one  or  five.    
   Thus,  appealing  to  fairness  to  justify  saving  the  greater  number  seems  
problematic.    Initial  investigation  suggests,  firstly,  that  it  might  be  impossible  to  be  fair  
in  these  cases  and,  secondly,  that  the  best  approximation  of  fairness  seems  to  be  not  
saving  the  greater  number  but  tossing  a  coin  to  decide  whom  to  save.    
   These  problems  are  well  known  and  recent  non-­consequentialist  accounts  
operate  against  this  background.    They  attempt  to  show  that,  despite  appearances,  one  
can  be  fair  in  tradeoff  cases  and  that,  contrary  to  Taurek,  fairness  requires  saving  the  
greater  number.    I  am  going  to  briefly  illustrate  the  most  prominent  of  these  recent  




       Kamm  claims,  as  does  Taurek,  that  we  ought  to  toss  a  coin  if  we  are  faced  with  a  
choice  between  saving  a  single  person  A  and  another  person  B  (and  all  else  is  equal).    
This  would  be  fair,  they  agree,  because  it  would  give  each  person  a  fifty  percent  chance  
of  being  saved  and  so  each  person  would  be  treated  the  same  way.    
   Where  Kamm  and  Taurek  differ  is  that  Taurek  would  still  use  a  coin  if  faced  with  
a  choice  between  saving  person  A  and  saving  two  other  people  B  and  C,  whilst  Kamm  
would  save  B  and  C.    Taurek  would  toss  coin  between  saving  A  and  saving  B  and  C  in  
order  to  give  each  of  A,  B  and  C  an  equal  (fifty  percent)  chance  of  being  saved.    
   Kamm  objects  that  in  using  a  coin  toss  he  would  be  proceeding  just  as  if  the  
choice  were  between  saving  A  and  just  the  individual  B,  rather  than  a  choice  between  
saving  A  or  saving  B  and  C.    The  presence  of  the  additional  person  C  would  be  making  
no  difference  to  his  actions.    C  could  complain  that  she  has  been  treated  unfairly,  Kamm  
claims,  since  her  ³presence  does  not  make  any  difference  to  the  outcome´.6      
   As  it  stands,  this  objection  to  Taurek  is  very  unpersuasive.7    The  mere  fact  that  
Taurek  would  perform  a  certain  action  whether  or  not  a  particular  person  is  present  
does  not  show  that  said  person  has  been  treated  unfairly.    For,  Kamm  herself  must  agree  
that  there  are  cases  where  one  should  perform  the  same  action  whether  or  not  some  
individual  is  present  and  that,  in  these  cases,  so  acting  is  not  unfair.    For  instance,  
suppose  that  I  can  easily  save  five  people  and  I  decide  to  do  so.    I  might  now  discover  
that  there  is  a  different  single  individual  whom  I  could  save  instead  of  the  initial  five.    
On  Kamm's  view,  I  should  still  go  ahead  and  save  the  five;;  the  presence  of  the  other  
single  individual  should  make  no  difference  to  what  I  do.    She  does  not  think  acting  in  
this  way  is  unfair.      
   Thus,  both  Taurek  and  Kamm  agree  that  only  sometimes  should  the  presence  of  
some  particular  individual  make  a  difference  to  how  we  act.    So  the  important  question  
is  whether  the  presence  of  C  should  make  a  difference  in  the  particular  case  we  are  
concerned  with.    Kamm  thinks  that  it  should.    She  thinks  that  someone  who  is  prepared  
to  toss  a  coin  whether  or  not  C  is  present  treats  C  unfairly.    To  proceed  in  this  way,  she  
claims,  would  be  unfair  because  it  would  give  no  significance  to  C's  need.8      Kamm¶s  
suggestion  is  that  if  we  toss  a  coin  when  we  can  either  save  A  or  save  B  and  C,  this  will  be  
unfair  to  C  because  her  presence  will  not  have  been  taken  into  account  in  our  decision  
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making.      
   Is  this  a  reasonable  objection  to  Taurek?    It  all  depends  on  what  we  have  to  do  to  
take  into  account  the  presence  of  person  C.    Kamm  is  assuming  that  in  this  situation  we  
must  be  fair  to  each  needy  person.    So,  on  her  view,  taking  into  account  Cµs  need  in  this  
situation  should  just  be  a  matter  of  giving  her  whatever  help  she  can  fairly  demand.      
   But,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  an  argument  Taurek  can  offer  for  thinking  that  
treating  C  fairly  just  requires  giving  her  an  equal  chance  of  being  saved.    Since  A  and  B  
are  just  as  needy  as  she  is,  C  can  demand  no  more,  as  a  matter  of  fairness,  than  to  be  
treated  the  same  as  they  are.    As  a  matter  of  fairness,  Taurek  can  say,  giving  C  an  equal  
chance  is  the  appropriate  way  to  take  account  of  her  need.9    So  more  needs  to  be  said  if  
Kamm  is  to  show  that  C  is  being  treated  unfairly.      
   Kamm  needs  to  show  that  fairness  to  C  requires  us  to  actually  save  her  rather  
than  just  give  her  an  equal  chance  of  being  saved.      But  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  she  could  
establish  this.    I  said  that  fairness  requires  treating  all  similarly  eligible  candidates  for  a  
good  similarly.    We  can  only  give  a  candidate  for  a  good  more  of  it  on  grounds  of  
fairness  if  she  herself  is  more  eligible  for  the  good.    For  instance,  suppose  grants  are  
being  given  out  to  researchers.    If  we  are  going  to  give  one  candidate  a  bigger  grant  than  
others  on  grounds  of  fairness,  we  have  to  show  that  she  is  better  qualified  or  otherwise  
more  eligible  for  funding  than  her  competitors.      
   Now,  Kamm  believes  that  when  just  A  and  B¶s  lives  are  at  stake,  each  is  equally  
eligible  for  your  help  and  should  be  given  an  equal  chance  of  getting  it.    But  she  thinks  
that  when  B  is  joined  by  another  person  C,  such  that  we  can  either  save  A  or  save  B  and  
C,  suddenly  fairness  requires  giving  no  chance  of  aid  to  A  and  giving  all  your  aid  to  B  
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and  C.    So  Kamm  must  claim  that  when  C  can  be  saved  along  with  B,  C  is  suddenly  more  
eligible  for  your  help  than  A.    Kamm  needs  to  give  reasons  for  thinking  that,  in  this  case,  
C  is  relevantly  different  from  A,  such  that  C  is  more  eligible  for  your  help  than  A  is.      
   It  is  hard  to  see  what  these  reasons  could  be.      A  and  C  both  stand  to  lose  their  
lives.    The  only  difference  between  them  is  that  C  can  be  saved  along  with  B.    But  this  
does  not  seem  to  make  C  herself  any  more  eligible  for  receiving  help  than  A.      It  is  thus  
hard  to  see  why  it  would  be  unfair  to  C  to  not  save  her  and  it  is  hard  to  see  why  it  would  
not  be  unfair  to  A  to  give  him  no  help  or  chance  of  help.      
   Thus,  Kamm¶s  project  of  trying  to  show  that  we  wrong  C  if  we  do  not  save  B  and  C  
over  A  faces  some  serious  difficulties.    It  is  hard  to  see  what  could  make  C  more  eligible  
for  help  in  this  case  than  A,  and  so  it  is  hard  to  see  why  fairness  requires  us  to  give  more  
help  to  C  than  to  A.    Kamm  has  not  provided  an  answer  to  the  challenges  I  presented  in  
the  previous  section  since  she  has  not  shown  that  fairness  can  be  done  in  Tradeoff  or  




   So  any  account  that  appeals  to  fairness  faces  serious  difficulties  in  explaining  why  
you  should  save  the  greater  number.    But  I  think  there  is  a  further  fundamental  problem  
with  appealing  to  fairness  in  these  contexts.    &RQVLGHUDWLRQVRIIDLUQHVVDV,¶OOSXWLWGR
not  apply  in  these  circumstances.    Compare,  for  instance,  my  decision  this  morning  
about  which  of  my  shoes  to  tie  first,  the  right  or  the  left.    Suppose  I  opt  for  the  right.    
This  is  clearly  permissible.    Is  it  fair?    The  correct  response  is  surely  that  it  is  neither  fair  
QRUXQIDLUIDLUQHVVQHLWKHUUHFRPPHQGVQRUWHOOVDJDLQVWWKLVFKRLFH,¶OOFKDUDFWHUL]H
WKLVE\VD\LQJWKDWLQWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHV³FRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIIDLUQHVVGRQRWDSSO\´,
think  we  should  similarly  say  that  considerations  of  fairness  do  not  apply  in  Tradeoff.    
Saving  the  greater  number  in  this  case,  I  think,  is  neither  required  by  fairness  nor  ruled  
out  by  fairness.      
It  seems  to  me  that  in  general  considerations  of  fairness  do  not  apply  to  our  
dealings  with  needy  strangers.    For  instance,  consider  the  following  case,      
  
Charities:  various  people  stop  me  on  the  street  and  ask  me  to  donate  
to  their  charities,  each  of  which  is  engaged  in  life  saving  activities  in  a  
different  area  of  the  world.     Each  is  only  asking  for  a  small  
contribution  but  that  contribution  will  help  save  a  life.            
  
   Each  of  these  charities,  and  the  people  they  serve,  is  equally  worthy  of  my  aid.    
Yet,  it  is  perfectly  permissible  for  me  to  just  pick  one  of  these  charities  and  give  all  of  my  
aid  to  them.    We  do  not  think  that  I  must  divide  my  aid  equally  between  them  or  find  
some  way  of  giving  each  charity  an  equal  chance  of  receiving  my  aid.    I  can  just  pick  
where  my  aid  is  going  to  go.    
   What  I  just  said  is  slightly  too  strong  because  some  ways  of  picking  where  to  send  
my  aid  do  seem  morally  abhorrent.    For  instance,  suppose  I  think  that  members  of  race  
R  are  inferior  and,  on  this  basis,  only  ever  give  aid  to  parts  of  the  world  where  members  
of  race  R  are  scarce.    This  would  be  morally  unacceptable.    It  might  be  said  that  we  
should  condemn  this  because  it  would  be  unfair  to  members  of  that  race  and  hence  that  
our  charitable  donations  really  are  constrained  by  fairness.      
   I  do  not  think  appealing  to  fairness  provides  a  very  good  explanation  for  why  it  is  
wrong  to  choose  in  this  way.    For  instance,  suppose  again  that  I  only  give  to  aid  to  parts  
of  the  world  where  race  R  is  scarce  but  that  the  reason  why  I  do  so  is  not  connected  to  
any  views  about  racial  superiority.    Rather,  I  am  just  a  creature  of  habit  and  tend  to  
always  give  my  aid  to  people  in  some  other  part  of  the  world,  where  there  is  just  as  much  
need.    Acting  in  this  way  does  not  seem  morally  unacceptable,  so  I  do  not  think  that  
fairness  requires  us  to  give  equal  aid,  or  equal  chances  of  aid,  to  members  of  different  
races.      
   :KDWLVZURQJZLWKJLYLQJRXWRQH¶VDLGZLWKUDFLVWPRWLYDWLRQVLVQRWWKDWLW
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UDFLVW¶VDLGGecisions  is  just  that  acting  on  racist  motivations  is  always  wrong,  even  when  
considerations  of  fairness  are  not  applicable.      
   So  our  intuitions  do  suggest  that  requirements  of  fairness  are  not  present  when  
we  are  giving  aid  to  strangers.    But  can  we  explain  why?    Can  we  give  some  rationale  for  
denying  that  aid  to  strangers  is  subject  to  fairness?    
   It  seems  to  me  that  fairness  only  comes  into  play  where  others  have  rights  
against  us.    Teachers  owe  it  to  their  students  to  provide  them  with  education,  parents  
owe  it  to  their  children  to  care  for  them,  members  in  good  standing  of  a  squash  club  are  
owed  the  benefits  the  club  provides.    All  of  these  are  cases  where  we  think  fairness  is  
required.    In  each  of  these  cases,  there  are  individuals  with  similar  rights  and  so  fairness  
comes  into  play  and  requires  that  they  are  treated  similarly.      
   By  contrast,  no  restaurant,  say,  has  a  right  that  I  attend  it  or  even  consider  
attending  it.    This  provides  an  explanation  for  why  I  am  not  required  to  be  fair  in  my  
decisions  about  where  to  eat  and  can  frequent  some  restaurants  more  than  others  as  I  
please.    Thus,  a  potential  explanation  for  why  fairness  is  not  relevant  to  aid  is  that  needy  
strangers  do  not  have  rights  to  our  aid.      
Is  it  true  that  needy  strangers  have  no  rights  to  our  aid?    This  is  a  difficult  and  
long  debated  question  which  I  cannot  fully  address  here,  but  I  think  there  is  a  good  case  
for  thinking  that  they  do  not.    For  instance,  we  think  it  perfectly  acceptable  to  not  help  
some  needy  persons  on  the  grounds  that  we  have  been  helping  others  a  lot  previously.    If  
individuals  had  rights  to  our  aid,  this  sort  of  justification  would  not  be  acceptable.    For  
instance,  since  I  owe  it  to  you  to  keep  my  promises,  I  cannot  justify  breaking  this  
promise  to  you  on  the  grounds  that  I  have  previously  kept  many  promises  made  to  
others.    Your  right  that  I  keep  my  promise  is  not  affected  by  what  I  have  done  for  others.    
Aid  is  clearly  different  and  a  good  explanation  of  why  it  is  different  is  that  no  one  has  
rights  to  our  aid.  
   It  might  be  said  that  even  though  needy  strangers  do  not  in  general  have  rights  to  
our  aid,  there  are  special  circumstances  where  they  do  and,  it  might  be  said,  Tradeoff  is  
one  of  those  circumstances.10    More  specifically,  it  might  be  said  that  individuals  have  
rights  to  our  aid  only  when  the  costs  to  us  of  providing  the  aid  are  low  and  there  is  no-­
one  else  around  who  can  provide  it.    Tradeoff  is  such  a  case,  so  perhaps  the  individuals  
in  Tradeoff  do  have  rights  to  your  aid.        
   I  think  this  suggestion  is  implausible.    Rights  do  not  ordinarily  go  in  and  out  of  
existence  depending  on  the  costs  to  us  of  fulfilling  them.    For  instance,  suppose  you  
were  no  threat  to  me  but  killing  you  was  the  only  way  to  save  my  life  (say,  the  Mafia  
have  said  they  will  kill  me  if  I  do  not  assassinate  you).    You  would  still  have  a  right  to  life  
against  me  despite  the  extremely  high  costs  to  me  of  not  infringing  that  right.    We  
should  thus  doubt  that  the  needy  persons  in  Tradeoff  have  a  right  to  your  pill  which  
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appears  only  because  the  costs  to  you  of  giving  the  pill  away  are  low.      
   It  seems  to  me  that  in  Tradeoff  the  only  person  who  has  a  right  to  the  pill  is  you.    
After  all,  you  own  it.    If,  say,  someone  stole  the  pill  to  give  it  to  the  needy,  they  would  
infringe  your  right  to  it  and  have  to  compensate  you  and  so  on.          
     All  the  same,  you  should  give  it  away.    It  would  not  only  be  praiseworthy  for  you  
to  do  so,  you  are  morally  required  to.    I  think  this  fact,  that  you  are  morally  required  to  
give  away  your  pill,  is  the  source  of  the  temptation  to  suppose  that  the  needy  in  Tradeoff  
have  rights  to  that  pill.    To  dispell  that  temptation,  one  needs  to  show  that  there  is  some  
other  explanation  for  why  you  are  morally  required  to  give  away  your  pill.11    I  show  this  




   The  appeal  to  rights  and  fairness  to  deal  with  cases  such  as  Tradeoff  seems  to  me  
to  not  only  make  the  wrong  predictions  but  also  to  simply  ignore  the  most  natural  
concepts  to  employ.    Think  about  ordinary  situations  where  private  persons  fail  to  
provide  for  the  needy  and  we  think  morality  requires  them  to.         
   Consider,  for  instance,  someone  who  does  not  stop  to  help  a  fallen  biker  out  of  
the  road,  someone  who  refuses  to  help  look  for  a  missing  child  or  someone  who  never  
gives  to  charity.    All  of  these  people  seem  to  me  to  have  acted  in  ways  that  are  morally  
wrong,  at  least  assuming  the  costs  to  them  of  aiding  are  not  excessively  high  and  they  
have  not  been  giving  a  lot  of  aid  in  the  past.    But  we  would  not  criticize  them  as  rights  
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violators  or  as  failing  to  be  fair.    Rather,  we  criticize  them  for  being  uncharitable,  selfish,  
callous,  ungenerous,  insensitive,  lacking  in  beneficence  or  similar.    It  seems  to  me  that  
we  use  the  latter  concepts  to  describe  a  very  different  sort  of  moral  failing  to  the  failure  
to  fulfill  people¶s  rights  or  to  be  fair.12    We  thus  need  to  recognize  that  a  very  different  
sort  of  moral  requirement  applies  in  these  cases.      
   7KHPRVWJHQHUDOWHUP,FDQILQGIRUWKLVVRUWRIPRUDOUHTXLUHPHQWLV³charity´.    
The  examples  I  gave  are  cases  where  people  fail  to  be  charitable  and  thereby  do  
something  morally  wrong.    The  cases  illustrate  that  charity  is  morally  required  of  us.    
We  are  not  required  to  be  heroically  charitable,  traveling  the  world  to  alleviate  suffering  
or  running  into  burning  buildings.    Doing  so  is  typically  morally  praiseworthy,  but  
beyond  what  morality  requires.    Being  charitable  is  morally  required.    Situations  where  
we  can  provide  aid  to  the  suffering  at  little  cost  seem  to  be  clear  cases  where  to  not  help  
would  be  morally  wrong.    We  need  not  appeal  to  rights  to  explain  why  this  would  be  
wrong.    A  perfectly  good  explanation  is  that  it  would  uncharitable  to  not  aid  in  these  
cases.        
   We  have  seen  that  requirements  of  charity  feature  heavily  in  our  everyday  moral  
thinking.    These  requirements  could  be  treated  quite  differently  within  different  non-­
consequentialist  theories.    Within  a  deontological  theory,  such  as  that  of  Ross,  one  could  
treat  requirements  of  charity  as  pro  tanto  moral  duties.    Within  a  virtue  theory,  one  
could  link  failures  of  charity  to  broader  defects  of  character  such  as  unkindness.    I  am  
not  going  to  consider  here  which  of  these  theories  is  correct  or  how  to  develop  it.    It  
seems  to  me  that  any  acceptable  non-­consequentialist  moral  theory  ought  to  include  
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some  category  of  requirements  of  charity  and  I  will  proceed  under  that  assumption.      
   We  saw  earlier  that  we  cannot  explain  why  it  is  wrong  to  not  save  five  in  Tradeoff  
by  appealing  to  fairness  or  rights.    I  think  we  can  give  a  better  explanation  by  appealing  
to  requirements  of  charity  instead.13    To  see  this,  let¶s  look  at  some  kinds  of  failure  to  be  
beneficent.      
   One  way  to  be  uncharitable  is  to  be  stingy  or  ungenerous  in  providing  aid.    In  
these  cases,  one  is  uncharitable  because  one  gives  away  fewer  resources  than  one  ought  
to.    For  instance,  suppose  that  I  see  a  man  by  the  side  of  the  road  with  a  broken  leg.    
³I¶YHEHHQO\LQJKHUHIRUKRXUVLQWKHKHDW´KHVD\V³SOHDVHJLYHPHDGURSRIZDWHU´    
You  recognize  his  need,  but,  you  think,  ³if  I  keep  all  of  the  water  in  my  bottle  I  could  use  
it  to  fix  my  hair  better  when  I  get  back  to  the  car´  
   This  would  be  profoundly  stingy  or  ungenerous  because  I  would  be  hoarding  my  
resources  for  myself  in  the  face  of  great  need.  
   But  this  doesn¶t  seem  to  me  to  be  the  only  way  to  be  uncharitable.    Another  way  is  
to  not  be  appropriately  sensitive  to  the  good  of  some  person,  quite  irrespective  of  the  
gains  to  oneself.    In  these  cases  one  acts  in  ways  that  are  callously  insensitive  to  what  is  
good  for  some  other  person(s),  even  though  there  is  no  benefit  to  oneself  of  doing  so.    
This  is  uncharitable  because  it  shows  a  callous  insensitivity  to  the  good  of  those  persons.    
Consider  the  following  example.  
  
Easy  Split:  I  have  a  pill,  of  little  use  to  me,  with  which  I  can  save  
someone's  life.    I  decide  to  give  it  to  him.    Now  I  discover  that  this  
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person  only  needs  half  the  pill  to  save  him,  and  so  I  can  split  it  and  
save  the  life  of  an  additional  person  with  the  remaining  half.    But,  I  
don¶t  bother  splitting  it.    I  just  give  the  whole  thing  to  the  one.      
  
   It  does  not  seem  that  my  behavior  in  such  a  case  would  be  stingy  or  ungenerous.    
I  am  not  withholding  any  of  my  resources  for  my  own  benefit.    Rather,  in  failing  to  split  
the  pill,  I  can  be  accused  of  being  callously  insensitive  to  the  good  of  the  additional  
person  whose  life  I  could  save.      
   I  have  two  options  which  are  in  all  respects  equivalent  except  for  the  fact  that  if  I  
choose  one  of  the  options  P  will  die,  whereas  if  I  choose  the  other  option  P  will  live.    I  
should  treat  the  fact  that  I  would  save  P  as  a  decisive  reason  for  choosing  the  option  of  
splitting  the  pill.    To  not  do  so  would  be  to  show  a  callous  insensitivity  to  the  good  of  P.    
To  show  such  insensitivity  to  need  seems  uncharitable  to  me.    So,  we  can  criticize  people  
for  being  uncharitable,  not  just  for  hoarding  their  resources,  but  also  for  giving  their  
resources  away  in  a  manner  that  does  not  show  appropriate  regard  for  the  good  of  some  
persons.      
   Someone  who  saves  one  rather  than  five  in  Tradeoff  also  cannot  be  accused  of  
hoarding  their  resources.    Furthermore,  Tradeoff  is  importantly  different  to  Easy  Split  
because  in  Tradeoff  one  is  faced  with  a  choice  between  saving  two  different  sets  of  
people  rather  than  a  choice  between  saving  one  person  or  saving  that  person  plus  an  
extra  person.    Still,  I  think  we  can  appeal  to  charity  in  Tradeoff  too;;  I  think  that  
someone  acts  uncharitably  if  they  do  not  save  the  many  in  Tradeoff.    I  think  someone  
who  does  not  save  the  greater  number  in  Tradeoff  shows  a  callous  insensitivity  to  the  
good  of  the  extra  people  they  could  save.    For,  in  choosing  to  give  the  pill  to  the  one,  they  
must  not  be  giving  proper  consideration  to  the  good  of  the  extra  people  they  could  save.    
All  of  this  seems  very  intuitive  to  me.    But  I  think  the  following  line  of  reasoning  may  
make  it  clearer.      
   Suppose  I  am  holidaying  on  my  boat  and  I  notice  two  people,  A  and  B,  drowning.    
If  I  sail  to  my  left,  then  I  will  be  able  to  easily  save  A  and  if  I  sail  to  my  right,  then  I  will  
be  able  to  easily  save  B.    But  there  is  not  enough  time  to  save  both.  
   It  would  certainly  be  uncharitable  to  not  take  a  few  minutes  out  of  my  holiday  to  
save  one  of  these  people.    It  is  up  to  me,  though,  to  decide  which  of  them  to  save.    
Morality  permits  me  to  sail  left  or  to  sail  right,  so  I  can  just  pick  which  way  to  go.      
   Why  am  I  allowed  to  just  pick  whether  to  sail  left  or  right?    I  think  this  is  because,  
as  a  matter  of  charity,  the  two  options  are  equally  acceptable.    Someone  reponding  
charitably  to  the  circumstances  would  be  equally  satisfied  with  saving  A  as  with  saving  
B.    The  charitable  person  would  see  that  each  stands  to  lose  his  life  and  will  be  equally  
satisfied  with  saving  either  one.      
   Suppose  I  now  discover  that  if  I  sail  to  my  right  I  will  be  able  to  pick  up  an  
additional  person,  C,  once  I  have  saved  B.    Should  I  save  person  A  alone,  or  should  I  
save  B  and  then  this  additional  person  C?    Should  I  sail  left  or  right?  
   As  we  have  seen,  taking  into  account  just  the  needs  of  A  and  B,  charity  requires  us  
to  sail  either  right  or  left  -­  each  option  is  equally  acceptable.    The  only  remaining  
consideration  is  the  additional  presence  of  C  on  the  right.    That  fact  that  C  can  be  saved  
if  I  sail  right  is  the  only  relevant  difference  between  sailing  right  and  sailing  left.      
Charity  surely  requires  me  to  take  this  difference  into  account  and  sail  to  the  right.      
   To  not  take  account  of  C  in  this  way  would  show  a  callous  insensitivity  to  her  
good.    This  is  a  situation  where  all  else  is  equal  except  for  the  fact  that  C¶s  life  can  be  
saved  if  I  sail  right  rather  than  left.    We  saw,  in  my  discussion  of  Easy  Split  that,  where  
all  else  is  equal,  one  ought  to  save  a  person¶s  life  where  one  can  do  so  at  no  extra  cost.    
To  not  do  so  is  to  is  show  a  callous  insensitivity  to  her  good.    So,  to  not  sail  right,  in  
order  to  save  C  as  well  as  B,  would  show  a  callous  insensitivity  to  C¶s  good.      
   Showing  such  a  lack  of  sensitivity  to  VRPHRQH¶VJRRG,  as  I  suggested  earlier,  is  
uncharitable.    So  it  is  uncharitable  to  not  save  B  and  C.    Similar  reasoning  might  be  
employed  in  any  case  where  we  face  trade-­offs  between  similarly  needy  persons.    In  any  
such  case,  it  would  be  uncharitable  to  not  save  the  greater  number  because  it  would  
show  a  callous  lack  of  sensitivity  to  the  good  of  the  extra  persons  who  would  be  saved  if  
one  helped  the  greater  number.         
   Now,  the  reasoning  I  have  employed  is  very  similar  to  some  suggestions  made  by  
Kamm  and  subsequent  non-­consequentialists.14    But  their  accounts  differ  crucially,  as  
we  have  seen,  because  they  are  appealing  to  fairness  and  this  makes  it  impossible  for  
them  to  argue  as  I  have  done.      
   For  instance,  I  relied  on  the  claim  that  it  is  permissible,  given  a  choice  between  
saving  A  or  saving  B,  to  choose  to  save  either  because  saving  either  is  just  as  beneficent.    
But  just  picking  between  A  and  B  is  not  permissible  where  fairness  is  required.    Fairness  
would  require  us  to  put  in  place  a  procedure,  such  as  coin  toss,  that  ensures  each  of  A  
and  B  will  get  an  equal  chance  of  aid.15      
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consider two ways you might select a can of soup at the market.  On the one hand, you might put in 
place a procedure designed to ensure that there is an equal chance of your selecting any given can, 
such as a can lottery.  But you could just grab a can from the shelf, taking no steps to ensure that the 
   Also,  I  claimed  that  when  we  can  save  C  along  with  B,  we  should  take  C¶s  
presence  into  account  by  treating  it  as  a  reason  to  sail  right  rather  than  left.    To  not  do  
so  would  show  a  callous  lack  of  sensitivity  to  Cµs  need.    Fairness  would  require  taking  C¶s  
presence  into  account  in  a  very  different  way,  making  sure  that  she  received  the  same  
treatment  as  A  and  B,  perhaps  by  giving  her  an  equal  chance  to  be  saved.    On  my  
account  there  is  no  such  requirement  of  fair  treatment  in  this  case  and  so  it  is  
permissible  to  just  sail  right  rather  than  left  on  account  of  Cµs  life.  
   More  generally,  fairness  accounts  face  an  objection  that  my  account  does  not.    
When  we  save  the  greater  number,  we  give  help  to  C  and  no  help  to  A.    Fairness  requires  
that  we  treat  all  similarly  eligible  candidates  for  a  good  similarly.    Thus,  in  order  to  
justify  saving  the  many  on  grounds  of  fairness,  one  must  be  able  to  say  what  makes  C  
more  eligible  for  the  good  than  A.    We  saw  earlier  that  doing  so  is  very  difficult.    Once  we  
abandon  the  appeal  to  fairness,  we  no  longer  need  to  explain  why  our  choice  treats  each  
candidate  similarly  and  hence  do  not  need  to  claim  that  C  is  more  eligible  for  the  good  
than  A.    Thus,  my  account  does  not  face  the  problem  that  fairness  accounts  face.      
   I  thus  conclude  that  it  is  wrong  to  save  the  lesser  number  in  cases  such  as  
Tradeoff  because  to  do  so  would  be  uncharitable.    It  would  be  uncharitable  because  it  
would  show  a  callous  insensitivity  to  the  good  of  some  persons.  
  
6.  
   Before  proceeding,  I  would  like  to  consider  some  potential  objections.    Many  
people  worry  that  the  answer  one  gives  to  the  numbers  problem  will  be  inconsistent  
with  some  other  firmly  held  convictions  of  ours.    They  note  that  we  have  a  firm  intuition  
                                                                                                                                                             
other cans get a chance of being selected.  You could just pick one. 
that,  faced  with  a  choice  between  saving  a  single  individual  from  death  and  a  million  
people  from  tiny  headaches,  one  should  save  the  single  individual.    Their  concern  is  that  
one's  answer  to  the  numbers  problem  will  undermine  this  intuition.16      
   I  cannot  fully  address  these  cases  here.    However,  I  think  they  do  not  provide  a  
direct  challenge  to  my  account,  since  my  account  leaves  open  whether  you  should  cure  
the  many  headaches  rather  than  save  a  life.    I  have  claimed  that  it  is  uncharitable  to  save  
one  person  rather  than  five  because  to  do  so  would  show  a  lack  of  concern  for  the  
additional  lives  one  could  save  by  helping  the  five.    I  defended  this  claim  by  noting  that  
faced  with  a  choice  between  saving  one  person  A,  and  another  person  B,  it  is  just  as  
charitable  to  save  either  person.      
A  choice  between  saving  one  person's  life  and  curing  another's  headache  is  very  
different.    I  suspect  most  people  would  not  think  it  is  just  as  charitable  to  cure  the  
headache  as  to  save  the  life.    So  the  explanation  I  offered  for  why  it  is  uncharitable  to  
save  one  life  rather  than  five  cannot  be  directly  used  to  argue  that  it  would  be  
uncharitable  to  save  one  person's  life  rather  than  cure  the  headaches  of  a  million  others.    
My  account  of  the  numbers  problem  leaves  open  the  question  of  whether  you  should  
save  the  single  life  over  the  many  headaches.      
As  I  said  in  the  introduction,  the  numbers  problem  is  the  problem  of  giving  a  
non-­consequentialist  explanation  for  why  we  should  save  the  greater  number.    Some  
may  question  whether  the  explanation  I  have  given  is  a  genuine  alternative  to  the  
consequentialist  one.    So,  I  would  like  to  briefly  clarify  the  respect  in  which  my  
explanation  differs  from  the  one  offered  by  the  consequentialist.      
   My  explanation,  like  the  consequentialist  one,  relies  in  part  on  considerations  
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about  what  would  be  good  for  certain  people.    But  it  does  not,  like  the  consequentialist  
one,  turn  on  facts  about  the  goodness  of  states  of  affairs.    Rather,  facts  about  what  would  
be  good  for  people  matter  in  my  account  because  they  affect  what  it  would  be  charitable  
or  beneficent  for  an  agent  to  do.      
   It  might  be  said  that  we  can  only  understand  what  it  is  for  someone  to  be  
charitable  or  beneficent  in  terms  of  what  would  promote  the  best  states  of  affairs.    But  I  
reject  this.    It  seems  to  me  that  the  idea  of  charity,  and  associated  notions  of  
beneficence,  generosity  and  so  on,  are  familiar  concepts  from  our  common  sense  
morality.    We  have  a  perfectly  good  grip  on  them,  it  seems  to  me,  without  having  to  
bring  in  any  notion  of  good  states  of  affairs.      
     Of  course,  the  consequentialist  can  claim  that  the  best  explanation  for  why  we  
should  be  beneficent  is  that  doing  so  will  produce  the  best  states  of  affairs.    But  in  so  far  
as  we  have  reason  to  reject  consequentialism,  in  light  of  the  familiar  objections  I  





   I  have  been  discussing  only  Tradeoff  and  similar  cases  where  the  agent  with  aid  
to  give  is  a  private  person  and  the  needy  are  strangers  to  her.    I  proposed  that  in  such  
cases  the  needy  have  no  rights  to  that  aid  and  that  considerations  of  fairness  are  
irrelevant.    For  these  cases,  the  explanation  of  why  one  should  save  the  five  appeals  to  
charity.    Still,  it  seems  to  me  that  there  are  some  important  cases  where  we  should  save  
the  greater  number  but  where  it  seems  inappropriate  to  appeal  to  charity  and  
considerations  of  fairness  are  relevant.    Before  concluding,  I  would  like  to  briefly  discuss  
some  of  these  cases  and  show  that  they  are  not  in  tension  with  my  account.         
   Consider,  for  instance,  agents  of  the  state,  such  as  firefighters,  public  health  
officials  and  so  on.    These  agents  are  frequently  required  to  save  the  lives  of  these  people  
and  find  themselves  in  tradeoff  situations  where  they  can  save,  say,  only  one  person  or  
five  but  not  both.    For  instance,  a  firefighter  might  find  herself  in  a  situation  where  she  
can  save  one  person  in  one  wing  of  a  building,  or  five  others  in  another  wing,  but  not  
both.      
   The  firefighter,  we  think,  ought  to  save  the  five.    Why  is  this?    One  explanation  is  
that  it  would  be  uncharitable  of  the  firefighter  to  not  save  five  and,  for  the  reasons  I  gave  
earlier,  I  think  it  would  indeed  be  uncharitable  of  her  to  not  save  five.    But  this  does  not  
seem  to  me  to  be  the  only  or  central  explanation  of  why  she  should  save  the  five.    It  
seems  to  me  that  the  firefighter  owes  it  to  the  five  to  save  them.      
   This  might  seems  puzzling  because,  given  that  both  firefighters  and  private  
persons  should  save  the  greater  number,  we  might  expect  the  explanation  of  why  they  
should  to  be  the  same.    I  do  not  find  this  very  troubling,  however,  since  the  reasons  why  
firefighters  are  required  to  put  out  fires  in  general  seem  quite  different  from  the  reasons  
why  a  private  person  might  be  required  to  put  out    a  fire.    Although  firefighters  should  
also  save  the  greater  number,  other  aspects  of  their  responsibilities  to  aid  reveal  
important  differences  between  them  and  private  persons.      
   For  instance,  we  think  firefighters  are  morally  required  to  go  into  burning  
buildings  to  save  people,  despite  the  personal  risk  of  doing  so,  when  we  would  not  think  
private  persons  were  required  to.    Also,  when  a  private  person  is  able  to  save  five  rather  
than  one  but  the  one  is  her  friend  we  think  it  perfectly  permissible  for  her  to  save  the  
one.17    But  firefighters  are  not  permitted  to  show  such  partiality.      
   These  differences  can  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  private  individuals  are  
required  to  provide  aid  as  a  matter  of  charity,  whereas  firefighters  owe  it  to  us  to  do  
their  job  of  putting  out  fires.    There  thus  seems  to  me  every  reason  to  expect  that  the  
central  explanation  for  why  firefighters  should  save  the  greater  number  will  be  quite  
different.      
   I  said  the  central  explanation  for  why  firefighters  should  save  more  seems  to  be  
that  saving  more  is  part  of  what  they  owe.    But  why  is  it  part  of  what  they  owe?    
   The  natural  answer  is  surely  that  it  is  typically  part  of  their  job  to  save  more  
rather  than  fewer.    This  answer  suggests  that  the  obligations  of  firefighters  are  fixed  by  
the  responsibilities  that  they  are  assigned  by  the  state.    Their  obligations  are  fixed  by  
what  policy  the  state  chooses  about  how  firefighters  are  to  react  in  different  
circumstances.    So,  a  perfectly  good  explanation  of  why  a  particular  firefighter  should  
save  the  greater  number  refers  to  the  policy  that  she  has  been  asked  to  follow.      
   There  is  a  further  question  we  can  ask  about  these  cases,  namely  what  policy  
should  be  enacted.    What  rule  should  the  state  tell  firefighters  to  follow  when  they  find  
themselves  faced  with  forced  choices  between  lives?    
   We  think  the  state  has  a  duty,  indeed  the  same  duty,  to  every  citizen  to  provide  
her  with  protection  from  fire.  In  coming  up  with  a  policy  for  its  firefighters,  the  state  is  
not  distributing  the  good  of  fire  protection  to  any  particular  person.    It  is  not  telling  
them  to  quell  any  particular  fire,  but  instructing  them  about  what  to  do  when  certain  
situations  arise.    In  coming  up  with  a  policy,  the  state  is  thus  determining  what  would  
happen  to  any  given  citizen  should  they  find  themselves  in  the  relevant  circumstances.    
                                                 
17 Taurek (1977) points this out.   
The  state¶s  decisions  will  thus  determine  what  the  chances  are  of  any  given  citizen  
getting  helped  if  they  find  themselves  in  need  of  it.  
   Suppose  the  state  is  deciding  between  the  policy  of  saving  the  greater  number  
and  the  policy  of  tossing  a  coin  to  decide  between  saving  more  or  fewer  people.    A  
randomly  selected  citizen  has  a  higher  chance  of  being  among  the  greater  number.    So  
the  choice  between  these  policies  is  just  a  choice  between  giving  every  citizen  a  higher  
chance  of  being  saved  or  a  lower  chance.18      
   Thus,  the  policy  of  saving  the  greater  number  seems  to  be  fair,  since  every  
citizen¶s  chances  of  being  saved  is  raised.    Each  person  is  treated  the  same  by  a  policy  
which  raises  each  person's  chances  of  being  saved.      
There  are  other  policies  that  also  give  person  the  same  chance  of  being  saved,  
such  as  the  policy  of  tossing  a  coin.    But  the  policy  of  saving  the  greater  number  is  more  
attractive  because  it  gives  each  person  the  highest  possible  chance  of  being  saved  
(consistent  with  everyone  else  getting  the  same).    Given  that  the  state  is  obligated  to  
provide  care  for  its  citizens,  surely  it  ought,  all  else  being  equal,  to  choose  the  policy  
which  benefits  them  the  most  and  this  is  the  policy  of  saving  the  greater  number.      
   So,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  right  way  to  explain  why  firefighters,  lifeguards,  etc.  
should  save  the  greater  number  is  to  refer  to  the  responsibilities  they  have  been  assigned  
by  state  policies.    We  can  ask  whether  such  policies  are  themselves  justified  given  what  
the  state  owes  to  its  citizens,  and  I  think  it  is  clear  that  they  are.      
  
  
                                                 
18 This argument draws on Taurek (1977).  His discussion has been interpreted in different ways but I 
think the argument I give is the strongest version of the one he offers.   
8.  
  
   In  conclusion,  let  me  briefly  summarize  what  we  have  found.    Non-­
consequentialists  have  assumed  that  we  must  justify  saving  the  greater  number  on  
grounds  of  fairness.    This  has  proved  very  difficult  and  so  the  numbers  problem  has  
been  thought  very  hard  for  non-­consequentialists.  
   The  difficulty  arises,  I  argued,  because  of  the  false  assumption  that  requirements  
of  fairness  apply  in  cases  such  as  Tradeoff.    This  assumption  is  false  because  we  are  not  
required  to  be  fair  in  giving  aid  to  needy  strangers.    Fairness  does  not  apply  to  these  
actions  because  needy  strangers  do  not  have  rights  to  our  aid.    Once  we  abandon  the  
assumption  that  fairness  is  required  of  us  in  these  cases,  we  can  justify  saving  the  
greater  number  much  more  easily  and  intuitively  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  the  charitable  
thing  to  do.        There  are  other  cases  of  tradeoffs,  such  as  those  involving  firefighters,  
lifeguards  and  so  on,  where  rights  and  fairness  do  seem  relevant  to  the  justification  for  
saving  more.    But  these  cases  are  importantly  different  and  do  not  stand  in  tension  with  
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